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The Perjury Dilemma in an
Adversary System
I. Introduction
A dilemma that occasionally confronts a criminal defense attorney
arises when his criminally accused client insists on taking the witness
stand against the attorney's advice. This problem becomes especially
acute and assumes ethical dimensions if the attorney believes the client
will commit perjury. The situation is best illustrated by an example.
The attorney's client is accused of committing the crime of rape. In
the initial consultation the client suggests that the prosecutrix consented
to their sexual relations and indicates that several of his friends are willing
to testify to this effect. In the second meeting, however, he reverses his
his position, now claiming that he never had sexual relations with the
prosecutrix and that he has an alibi for his whereabouts at the time of the
alleged rape. He also indicates his preference for a jury trial and expresses
a desire to take the stand to plead his innocence. At no time in either of
the two interviews with the attorney did the client admit guilt or state that
he would commit perjury at trial. On the day of the trial the client finally
admits to the attorney that he had sexual relations with the prosecutrix
under circumstances that render his innocence questionable. Neverthe-
less, he insists on testifying to make an alibi defense and is confident of
success.
Under these facts it would appear that the attorney has the following
three options: withdraw from the case, place his client on the stand and
proceed in the normal fashion in presenting his testimony and arguing his
case to the jury, or allow his client to make a narrative statement on the
stand and refrain from engaging in direct examination and from arguing
the client's testimony in his closing argument. Each of these courses of
conduct has distinct difficulties, and however he chooses, the attorney
encounters conflicts that result from his dual role of serving his client and
the law. He must be mindful that he is both an advocate and an officer of
the court. Moreover, he must be conscious of his client's constitutional
rights, in particular his rights to be heard and present a defense and the
right to the effective assistance of counsel. This comment analyzes the
attorney's options when he is confronted with a potentially perjurious
client in a criminal case and the constitutional limitations imposed on
these options. I
II. The Attorney's Conflicting Roles in the Adversary System
A. Duty to the Court
The characterization of counsel as an officer of the court is deeply
rooted in the history of the legal profession. 2 As an officer of the court the
attorney undertakes several duties that are broadly summarized in Ethical
Consideration E C 9-6 of the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility.
Every lawyer owes a solemn duty to uphold the integrity and
honor of the profession; to encourage respect for the law and
for the courts and the judges thereof; to observe the Code of
Professional Responsibility; to act as a member of a learned
profession, one dedicated to public service; to cooperate with
his brother lawyers in supporting the organized bar through
devoting his time, efforts and financial support as his profes-
sional standing and ability reasonably permit; to conduct him-
self so as to reflect credit on the legal profession and to insure
confidence, respect, and trust of his clients and the public; and
to strive to avoid not only professional impropriety but also the
appearance of impropriety.3
Because the attorney, in carrying out these duties, owes his'highest
obligation to the administration of justice,' certain restrictions have been
imposed on his representation of clients. Consequently, an attorney
cannot suppress evidence that he or his client is required by law to
reveal, 5 nor can he engage in any conduct that disturbs the decorum of
judicial proceedings. 6 Furthermore, the Disciplinary Rules explicitly pro-
hibit him from knowingly using perjured testimony or false evidence,'
I. Although the fifth amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination is
relevant to this analysis, particularly to the attorney-client privilege, it is not addressed in
this comment because compulsion questions have traditionally been concerned with the
social desirability of the state's influence on the criminal defendant. See generally United
States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 219 (1967). This analysis is concerned primarily with the effect that
the attorney's conduct may have on his client's constitutional rights.
2. See, e.g., Exparte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 378 (1886); In re Cohen, 370 F.
Supp. 1166, 1174 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); People ex rel. Karlin v. Culkin, 248 N.Y. 465, 473, 162
N.E. 487, 490 (1928); ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS No. 22; ABA COMMITTEE ON
PROFESSIONAL ETHICS AND GRIEVANCES, OPINION 287 (1953).
3. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (emphasis added) (footnotes omit-
ted) [hereinafter cited ad ABA CODE]. The Code was adopted by the House of Delegates of
the American Bar Association on August 12, 1969 and replaced the ABA Cannons of
Professional Ethics. It is organized into Canons, Ethical Considerations, and Disciplinary
Rules. The Canons are statements of "axiomatic norms" expressing the standard of
conduct expected of lawyers, while the Ethical Considerations state aspirations for which
every lawyer should strive. The Disciplinary Rules "state the minimum level of conduct
below which no lawyer can fall without being subject to disciplinary action." Id., Prelimi-
nary Statement.
4. ABA PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION
AND THE DEFENSE FUNCTION, Comment a to § 1. 1(a), at 172 (1971) [hereinafter cited as ABA
STANDARDS].
5. ABA CODE, supra note 3, EC7-27.
6. Id. EC7-36.
7. Id. DR7-102(A) (4).
participating in the preservation of false evidence, 8 or assisting his client
in any illegal or fraudulent conduct. 9
Thus, the attorney's role as an officer of the court qualifies his
relationship with his client. For example, the ethical duty of confidentiali-
ty cannot be considered absolute. Under various circumstances an attor-
ney may be expected to reveal his client's confidential communications.' 0
In addition, he is required to disclose to the court any fraud that has been
perpetrated on it by his client once the attorney discovers the fraud and his
client refuses to rectify its effects." The breach of any of these respon-
sibilities will expose the attorney to disciplinary measures, particularly if
he allows his client to testify falsely. 12
B. Duty to Act as his Client's Zealous Advocate
In addition to functioning as an officer of the court, the attorney is
also his client's representative and advocate. As such, it is his primary
responsibility to champion his client's cause 13 by presenting the facts in a
light most favorable to his client' 4 and by fully applying his skills,
8. Id. DR7-102(A) (5) & (6).
9. Id. DR7-102(A) (7).
10. DR4-101 (C) of the ABA Code indicates that a lawyer may reveal the following:
(I) Confidences or secrets with the consent of the client or clients affected, but
only after a full disclosure to them.
(2) Confidences or secrets when permitted under Disciplinary Rules or required
by law or court order.
(3) The intention of his client to commit a crime and the information necessary to
prevent the crime.
(4) Confidences or secrets necessary to establish or collect his fee or to defend
himself . . . against an accusation of wrongful conduct.
It is important to note that this rule is permissive only and does not require an attorney to
reveal anything. Nevertheless, some courts and ethics committees have held that the
attorney is required, under certain circumstances, to reveal his client's intention to commit a
crime. For a list of some of these circumstances, see Callan & David, ProfessionalRespon-
sibility and the Duty of Confidentiality: Disclosure of Client Misconduct in an Adversary
System, 29 RUTGERS L. REV. 332, 354 (1976).
I1. ABA CODE, supra note 3, DR7-102(B) (1). This rule only applies if the information
'clearly establishes" that a fraud has been committed and if the fraud occurred "in the
course of the representation." Id. According to Callan & David, supra note 10, at 357-58,
this provision only applies to fraudulent acts committed in the past and does not apply to
prior crimes, since the attorney's disclosure would interfere with the client's fifth amend-
ment privilege against self-incrimination. Thus, when the attorney learns that the client
committed the crime of perjury, he need not make any disclosure.
12. Although there are few reported cases in which disciplinary proceedings were
brought against an attorney for allowing his client to commit perjury in criminal cases,
numerous such proceedings have resulted from civil cases. See ANNOT., 40 A.L.R.3d 169
(1971). The perjured testimony in most of the cases cited in the annotation dealt with issues
that were dispositive of the case. For example, the false testimony in divorce proceedings
generally dealt with the residency of the party seeking divorce. Neither the attorney's profit
motive nor the degree of the attorney's moral turpitude, however, dictated the appropriate
disciplinary sanction. Moreover, the attorney's assertion of the attorney-client privilege and
the duty of nondisclosure were unavailing. Consequently, this case law offers little guidance
to the attorney confronted with the dilemma of permitting his client to testify or exposing his
anticipated or past fraud.
13. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 4, at 145.
14. See ABA CODE, supra note 3, CANON 7. For a discussion of the attorney's duty as
an advocate under Canon 7 of the ABA CODE, see, Gaudineer, Ethics: The Zealous
Advocate, 24 DRAKE L. REV. 79, 98 (1974).
experiences, and judgment.15 He may not intentionally fail to seek his
client's lawful objectives through any reasonable means available, and he
is subject to discipline if he intentionally prejudices his client during the
course of his representation. t6 In exercising his professional judgment he
must act in a manner consistent with his client's best interests. 17 In brief,
he must resolve all doubts in favor of his client within the bounds of the
law.
18
One of the attorney's most fundamental duties to his client is the
protection of his client's confidences and secrets.19 This duty is an aspect
of the fiduciary nature of the attorney-client relationship20 and is con-
sidered so essential to effective representation and to the proper function-
ing of the legal system that the obligation is protected by the attorney-
client privilege. 2' Furthermore, the attorney must be conscious of his
client's constitutional rights. For example, his client has a constitutional
right to the effective assistance of counsel. 22 Regardless of what standard
is used to .measure his conduct, he must at least insure that his client's
trial is not a sham or mockery of justice. 23 Closely related to this right are
15. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 4, at 147, 153.
16. ABA CODE, supra note 3, DR7-101 (A) (1) & (3).
17. Id., EC7-9.
18. Id., EC7-3; ABA OPINION 314 (1965). This duty includes resolving any doubts
about whether a client's contemplated action is illegal, when state of mind is in issue, in
favor of the client. ABA CODE, supra note 3, EC7-6. In general, the attorney should refrain
from acting as an umpire. ABA OPINION 280 (1949), accord, Gallegos v. Turner, 256 F.
Supp. 670 (D.C. Utah 1966). Nevertheless, he must assume an active role in organizing the
case, ABA STANDARDS, supra note 4, § 5.2, although he is required to keep his client
informed of the practical effect of any tactic he chooses and the probable rulings by the
court. ABA CODE, supra note 3, EC7-5. This requirement applies to the decisions that are
exclusively within the authority of the client to make, ABA STANDARDS, supra note 4, §
5.2(a); Accord, ABA CODE, supra note 3, EC7-7, and, therefore, the attorney must insure
that these decisions are well informed. ABA CODE, supra note 3, EC7-8.
19. Id., CANON 4.
20. Id., EC4-1. In Callan & David, supra note 10, the following three main sources of
law are considered relevant to the attorney's duty to maintain the client's confidences: the
attorney-client privilege, the disciplinary rules of the ABA CODE, and the fifth amendment.
The authors believe that a thorough understanding of each of these three areas of the law is
essential before an attorney can "accurately assess whether he is permitted or ethically
required to make disclosure of a client confidence." Id. at 336.
21. The rationale underlying this policy has been aptly stated as follows:
The privilege exists because by judicial consensus it is vital to an accusatorial
system of justice. The rationale involves four premises: that the basic purpose of a
trial is the determination of truth; that in an adversary system this purpose is best
served by presenting the judge and jury with a clash between proponents of
conflicting views; that effective advocacy, in turn, rests upon the attorney's
knowledge of all the facts relevant to his case, both the favorable and the damag-
ing; and that to ensure complete candor between attorney and client, the details of
their professional relationship must be privileged.
Callan & David, supra note 10, at 337 n.28 (quoting Note, Professional Responsibility and In
re Ryder: Can an Attorney Serve Two Masters? 54 VA. L. REV. 145, 156 (1968) (footnotes
omitted)). It should be recognized that the attorney-client privilege does not apply to the
client's "secrets" but only to his confidences. See, e.g., Comment, Confidential Informa-
tion Under the Code of Professional Responsibility-Canon 4, 79 DICK. L. REV. 650, 656
(1975).
22. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
23. See notes 136-48 and accompanying text infra.
his client's sixth and fourteenth amendment rights to due process of law
and a fair trial. The attorney must do everything in his power to guarantee
that his client has a reasonable opportunity to be heard and to present a
defense. 24 Thus, the attorney must carefully consider the implications that
his conduct could have on his client's constitutional rights.
C. The Attorney's Role in the Search for Truth
In addition to his dual function as officer of the court and client's
representative, the attorney must also consider his role in an adversary
system of justice. The adversary system operates essentially as a contest
between two opposing factions out of which emerge certain facts that
support the final decision and, ultimately, the "truth." A judge, a
prosecutor, and a defense attorney all discharge assigned functions25 that
permit the criminal justice system to yield a just verdict. Nevertheless,
characterization of the process is complicated by considerations that
necessarily arise from society's emphasis on individual human dignity.
It is commonly recited that the American criminal justice system is
not inquistiorial, but accustorial. 26 This necessarily gives rise to the
presumption that the accused is innocent until proved guilty by the
prosecution.2 The criminal defendant is further protected by various
safeguards that are implicitly and explicitly guaranteed by the Constitu-
tion. 28 Some commentators have observed that, as these rights have
evolved, there has been a gradual shift in the emphasis of criminal
proceedings from the search for truth (i.e., the guilt or innocence of the
accused) toward a determination of the legality of prosecutorial
methods. 29 This observation has particular relevance for the legality of
the methods employed in securing evidence against the accused.30
Illustrative of this shift is the application of the exclusionary rule to
the fourth amendment law of search and seizure and the fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination. Since the Supreme Court promul-
gated the exclusionary rule in Weeks v. United States,31 indisputably
24. See, e.g., In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273 (1948).
25. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 4, Comment a to § 1.)
26. See, e.g., Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966); Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436 (1966).
27. See, e.g., ABA PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, PROVIDING DE-
FENSE SERVICES 1 (1967).
28. See, e.g., United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116 (1966) (right to a speedy trial);
Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237 (1895) (right to confrontation); United States v.
Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1876) (right to notice of accusation); United States v. Cooper, 4
U.S. (4 DalI) 341 (C.C. Pa. 1800) (right to compulsory process).
29. M. FLEMING, THE PRICE OF PERFECT JUSTICE 121 (1974); Starrs, Professional
Responsibility: Three Basic Propositions, 5 AM. CRiM. L.Q. 17, 21 (1966).
30. FLEMING, supra note 28, at 124 (1974). The accuracy of this statement may be
questionable in light of the Burger Court's view of the defendant's rights. See, e.g., The
Supreme Court Term, 1973 Term, 88 HARV. L. REV. 43, 197 (1974) (Court is moving away
from the position taken in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)).
31. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
reliable evidence obtained in violation of the fourth amendment has been
excluded from criminal cases. 32 The rule has also suppressed admissions
and confessions, even though voluntary and credible, solely because they
were obtained in violation of the fifth amendment. 33 These prophylactic
rules function primarily as a deterrent. The fourth amendment exclusion-
ary rule is not designed to provide a remedy for the defendant, but to
remove any incentive for the police to engage in unreasonable searches
and seizures. 34 The fifth amendment safeguards are considered necessary
to preserve the privilege against self-incrimination by insuring that an
individual subjected to custodial police interrogation has not been coerced
into a confession.
35
Regardless of the reasons offered to justify the exclusionary rule, its
effect on the adversary system is apparent. It is not intended to aid the
search for truth, and consequently, for purposes of the fourth and fifth
amendments, the attainment of truth at trial cannot be considered an
absolute. 36 Thus, in practice, trial is only partially a search for truth, and
the constitutional guarantees accorded to the defendant may outweigh the
truth-seeking goal of the system.
37
III. Proposed Solutions to the Attorney's Dilemma
A. The ABA Defense Function Standards
The ABA Advisory Committee on The Prosecution Function and
Defense Function has proposed a course of conduct to resolve the attor-
32. The rule enjoyed only limited application for several years because it did not
require state courts to exclude all evidence obtained in violation of the fourth amendment.
Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949). In the early sixties, however, the Court held that the
fourteenth amendment incorporated fully the exclusionary rule as an essential element of
the fourth amendment. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). Nevertheless, the rule has not
been without its critics. See, e.g., Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 493 (1971)
(Black, J., concurring and dissenting); People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 21, 150 N.E. 585, 587
(1926).
33. See, e.g., Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324 (1969); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966).
34. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
35. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
36. One commentator stated that "[tihe criminal defense lawyer must understand that
the criminal trial, as we know it in the Anglo-American system, is not a search for truth, but
rather the occasion for the prosecution to prove the accused's guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt." Starrs, Professional Responsibility: Three Basic Propositions, 5 AM. CRIM. L.Q. 17,
21 (1967).
37. M.H. FREEDMAN, LAWYER'S ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM 2 (1975). The
defense attorney's duties resulting from the ambivalent nature of the criminal justice system
and his role to zealously represent his client's interests were summarized by Justice White in
his dissenting and concurring opinion in United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218,256-57 (1967).
Law enforcement officers have the obligation to convict the guilty and to make
sure they do not convict the innocent. They must be dedicated to making the
criminal trial a procedure for the ascertainment of the true facts surrounding the
commission of the crime. . . .But defense counsel has no comparable obligation
to ascertain or present the truth . . . .He must be and is interested in preventing
the conviction of the innocent, but, absent a voluntary plea of guilty, we also insist
that he defend his client whether he is innocent or guilty. The State has the
obligation to present the evidence. Defense counsel need present nothing, even if
knows what the truth is . . . . In this respect . . .we countenance or require
conduct which in many instances has little if any relation to the search for truth.
(emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
ney's dilemma when he believes his client intends to commit perjury.
Pursuant to the ABA Standards, if the attorney represents a defendant
who has admitted facts that tend to establish guilt and the attorney has
independently established their existence, then, if the defendant insists on
his right to trial, the attorney must warn him against committing per-
jury. 38 If before trial the defendant insists on taking the stand to testify
falsely, the attorney must withdraw from the case.39 If, however, with-
drawal is not permitted or possible, the attorney should record this
conflict between himself and the client. Then, when the client takes the
stand, the attorney must confine his examination to identifying the wit-
ness and permitting him to make a narrative statement to the factfinder.
Since he may in no way aid the perjury, the attorney cannot argue, recite,
or rely on any of the false testimony in his closing argument, nor can he
even engage in direct examination of the defendant.'
The ABA considers this position the most reasonable accommoda-
tion to the competing demands of the attorney's obligations under the
Code4' and the defendant's right to testify.42 The solution is premised on
the absolute rule that a lawyer may never present false evidence.43 This
tenet is considered so fundamental to the integrity of the justice system
that any resolution of the conflict must begin with it. 44
By adhering to the ABA Standards, the attorney will discharage his
responsibilities as officer of the court and his concomitant obligation to
38. 7.7 Testimony by the defendant.
(a) If the defendant has admitted to his lawyer facts which establish guilt and
the lawyer's independent investigation establishes that the admissions are true but
the defendant insists on his right to trial, the lawyer must advise his client against
taking the witness stand to testify falsely.
(b) If, before trial, the defendant insists that he will take the stand to testify
falsely, the lawyer must withdraw from the case, if that is feasible, seeking leave of
the court if necessary.
(c) If withdrawal from the case is not feasible or is not permitted by the court
or if the situation arises during the trial and the defendant insists upon testifying
falsely in his own behalf, the lawyer may not lend his aid to the perjury. Before the
defendant takes the stand in these circumstances, the lawyer should make a record
of the fact that the defendant is taking the stand against the advice of counsel in
some appropriate manner without revealing the fact to the court. The lawyer must
confine his examination to identifying the witness as the defendant and permitting
him to make his statement to the trier or the trier of facts; the lawyer may not
engage in direct examination of the defendant as a witness in the conventional
manner and may not later argue the defendant's known false version of facts to the
jury as worthy of belief and he may not recite or rely upon the false testimony in
h:is closing argument.
ABA STANDARDS, supra note 4, 7.7.
39. Id. § 7.7(b).
40. Id. § 7.7(c).
41. See ABA Code, supra note 3, DR7-102 (A) (4).
42. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 4, Comment to § 7.7, at 275.
43. Bress, Professional Ethics in Criminal Trials: A View of Defense Counsel's Re-
sponsibility, 64 MicH. L. REV. 1493 (1966); Burger, Standards of Conduct for Prosecution
and Defense Personnel: A Judge's Viewpoint, 5 AM. CRIM. L.Q. II, 12 (1966); Measher, A
Critique of Lawyers' Ethics in an Adversary System, 4 FORDHAM URB. L. REV. 289, 295
(1975).
44. See Burger, supra note 43, at 12. Justice Burger reasons that the rule against the
use of perjured testimony must be absolute or there would be no reason to deny its use to the
prosecution.
the administration of justice. 45 He will not denegrate the profession in the
eyes of the public and will avoid actively perpetrating a fraud on the
court. 46 Furthermore, adherence to these guidelines should preclude dis-
ciplinary proceedings for violations of the ABA Code4 7 or criminal
proceedings for the subornation of perjury .48
This course of conduct constitutes a compromise, however, for
while the attorney remained as his client's counsel without active partici-
pation in fraud, he did not prevent the commission of the crime of
perjury. Also, there is no guarantee that the factfinders were not influ-
enced by the false testimony. Moreover, if the attorney remains as
counsel but merely permits the defendant to narrate without further
assistance, his conduct conflicts with his duty to present the best possible
defense.49 Such conduct may also deprive the defendant of substantial
constitutional rights50 and constitute a failure of the attorney to zealously
represent his client."1 Finally, there is a likelihood that the attorney has
alienated his client.
B. Professor Freedman's Position
As an alternative to the ABA Defense Function approach, the attor-
ney could place his client on the stand, elicit his testimony on direct
examination, and then argue the testimony to the jury as skillfully as
possible. This position, which is advocated by Professor Monroe Freed-
man, has generated considerable controversy. 52 Professor Freedman's
position is based on several considerations, including the attorney's
function in an adversary system, the prosecution's burden of proof, and
the nature of the attorney-client relationship.
First, the purpose of the adversary system is to establish the truth
through a presentation to judge and jury of the clash between proponents
of conflicting views.5 3 To represent the client effectively, it is essential
that the advocate be entirely devoted to the client and that he maintain
45. See notes 2-21 and accompanying text supra.
46. ABA CODE, supra note 3, DR7-102(a).
47. Id.
48. There may be some question whether an attorney who reluctantly permits his
client to commit perjury is guilty of subornation of perjury. According to Monroe Freed-
man, subornation "consists of willfully procuring perjury, which is not the case when the
attorney indicates to the client that the client's proposed course of conduct would be
unlawful, but then accepts the client's decision." M. FREEDMAN, supra note 37, at 31.
49. ABA CODE, supra note 3, EC7-9.
50. See notes 114-123 and 178-187 and accompanying text infra.
51. See M. FREEDMAN, supra note 37, at 30.
52. Professor Freedman was subjected to personal attack after he presented the
substance of this position in a paper to the Criminal Trial Institute of the District of
Columbia. Several judges complained to the Committee on Admissions and Grievances of
the District Court of the District of Columbia, urging that disciplinary action be taken
against him. After four months of proceedings, the committee announced its decision to
"proceed no further in the matter." Freedman, Professional Responsibility of the Criminal
Defense Lawyer: The Three Hardest Questions, 64 MICH. L. REV. 1469 n. I (1966).
53. M. FREEDMAN, supra note 37, at 4.
with him the fullest uninhibited communication. 54 It "requires that the
attorney's every word, action, and attitude be consistent with the conclu-
sion that his client is innocent." 
55
Second, in the criminal justice system the defendant is presumed
innocent and the burden is on the government to prove guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt.5 6 Consequently, the client is deemed innocent, before
conviction, even when he has confessed guilt to his attorney. 57 He has
rights to a fair trial, to the effective assistance of counsel, to remain
silent, and to plead "not guilty" despite his guilt.
58
Last, Professor Freedman's analysis subordinates the attorney's
function as an officer of the court to the client's interests and, therefore,
the obligation of confidentiality remains unqualified. 59 Since the attorney
must ascertain all facts pertinent to the criminal charge to effectively
represent his client, he must establish a relationship of trust and confi-
dence. 6° The obligation of confidentiality is essential because it assures
the client that everything he tells the attorney is safeguarded and will not
be used to incriminate him.
6 1
Thus, Professor Freedman sees no alternative to placing the client on
the stand and eliciting his testimony.62 Any contrary position would raise
constitutional problems of depriving his client of due process and the
denial of the right to counsel. 63 In addition, it would be inconsistent with
the "maintenance of the adversary system, the presumption of innocence,
the prosecution's burden to prove quilt beyond a reasonable doubt,.
and the obligation of confidentiality ....
54. Freedman, supra note 52, at 1470.
55. Id. at 1471.
56. M. FREEDMAN, supra note 37, at 28.
57. Freedman, supra note 52, at 1471.
58. Id. Professor Freedman emphasizes that the adversary system has its foundations
in the respect for human dignity. "Before we will permit the state to deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, we require that certain processes be duly followed which ensure
regard for the dignity of the individual, irrespective of the impact of those processes upon
the determination of truth." M. FREEDMAN, supra note 37, at 3.
59. Id. at 40.
60. "[P]rofessional responsibility requires that an advocate have full knowledge of
every pertinent fact, [therefore] the lawyer must seek the truth from the client, not shun it."
Id. at 30.
61. "[T]he lawyer will not be successful [in getting the truth from the client] without
convincing the client that full disclosure to the lawyer will never result in prejudice to the
client by any word or action of the attorney." Id.
62. "1 continue to stand with those lawyers who hold that 'the lawyer's obligation of
confidentiality does not permit him to disclose the facts he has learned from his client which
form the basis for his conclusion that the client intends to perjure himself.'" Id. at 40
(footnotes omitted).
63. The problem would arise because "the defendant would have been tried before,
and sentenced by, a judge who had been informed by the defendant's own lawyer that the
defendant is guilty both of the crime charged and perjury." Id. at 34.
64. Freedman, supra note 52, at 1482.
IV. Constitutional Inadequacies of the ABA Defense Function Stan-
dards
A. Client's Right to Testify
Were the criminal defendant protected by a constitutional right to
testify, the attorney's dilemma, when he believes his client will perjure
himself, would be heightened even further.65 Certainly no such right
existed at common law, since defendants were deemed incompetent to
testify. 6 The rule was predicated on a presumption that the criminal
defendant was an interested party and, therefore, would testify according
to his own interests rather than truthfully. 67 This incapacity was gradually
removed by state68 and federal69 competency statutes, most of which
provide that the criminal defendant is, at his request, considered a
competent witness.7" These statutes have not, however, been construed to
give the criminal defendant an absolute right to testify in his own be-
half. 7' Instead, they have merely enabled defendant's counsel to present
the defendants testimony if counsel deems it necessary for the defense.
7 2
Although a right to testify has been recognized by most state and
federal courts, the Supreme Court has not specifically ruled whether the
right is constitutionally protected. 73 Such a determination has apparently
not been considered necessary, since the right to testify has been statutori-
ly guaranteed in every jurisdiction. 4 Recent decisions indicate, however,
65. See notes 87-94 and accompanying text infra.
66. Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570, 573 (1961).
67. This presumption was an aspect of the disqualification-for-interest rule. See, e.g.,
State v. Barrows, 76 Me. 401, 409 (1884); State v. Wilcox, 206 N.C. 691,693, 175 S.E. 122,
123 (1934).
68. A list of current state statutes that render criminal defendants competent to testify
can be found in Comment, Due Process v. Defense Counsel's Unilateral Waiver of the
Defendant's Right to Testify, 3 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 517, 541-42 (1976).
69. 18 U.S.C. § 3481 (1970).
70. The federal statute is typical of many of the competency statutes. "In trial of all
persons charged with the commission of offenses against the United States . . . the person
charged shall, at his own request, be a competent witness. His failure to make such a request
shall not create any presumption against him." Id. (emphasis added).
71. See notes 95-98 and accompanying text infra.
72. See, e.g., Sims v. Lane, 411 F.2d 661 (7th Cir. 1969). "[T]he exercise of this right
is subject to the determination of competent trial counsel and varies with the facts of each
case." Id. at 664.
73. The Court had the opportunity to do so in Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570
(1961), but the majority felt that the issue was not properly before the Court. Justice Clark in
his concurring opinion disagreed with the majority on this point and felt that the court had
failed to resolve the more crucial issue in the case. "Reaching the basic issue of incompeten-
cy, as I feel one must, I do not hesitate to state that in my view [the incompetency statute]
does not meet the requirements of due process and that, as an unsatisfactory remnant of an
age gone by, it must fall as surely as does its palliative, [the Georgia unsworn statement
statute]." Id. at 602.
74. United States v. Ives, 504 F.2d 935 (9th Cir. 1974), vacated, 421 U.S. 944 (1975).
Because of the statute enacted in 1878 [18 U.S.C. 3481], making a defendant a
competent witness in a federal case, we have not been required to determine
whether the Constitution separately guarantees an accused the privilege of tes-
tifying.
that the right transcends its statutory origins and may be an essential
aspect of the constitutional guarantees of due process and fair trial. 75 The
nature of this right has particular importance for the attorney's dilemma
because if it is constitutionally mandated, the attorney could not unilater-
ally waive the accused's right to testify.7 6
1. Judicial Recognition of the Right to Testify as an Element of
Due Process.-Since the Constitution does not specifically address the
right to testify, the right, if it is of constitutional proportion, must be an
aspect of the due process clause of the fifth and fourteenth amendments.
77
Federal courts have often recognized the constitutional stature of rights
that, though not expressly guaranteed by the Constitution, are essential to
due process. 78 Thus, as it relates to the trial of the criminally accused, the
right to due prosess is "in essence the right to a fair opportunity to defend
against the state's accusations." 79 Due process guarantees the defendant a
reasonable opportunity to be heard and to present evidence."' Conse-
quently, the accused must have the fullest occasion to meet the accusa-
tions against him,8 ' including an adequate opportunity to present his case
in an impartial trial.2
Several state courts have acknowledged the fundamental importance
of the right to testify by summarily ruling that a criminal defendant has a
constitutional right to testify in his own behalf.8 3 In so ruling, many of the
courts relied on the language of various federal courts that indicated that
the right to be heard is an element of due process84 and, as such,
Although not identifying it as a constitutional guarantee, most courts in recent
years have recognized that a defendant should be allowed to testify in his defense.
The courts have not been precise in identifying the source or nature of this interest.
Some have referred to it as a privilege while others have termed it a right.
504 F.2d at 939.
75. See notes 83, 86 infra.
76. See notes 101-08 and accompanying text infra.
77. United States ex rel. Wilcox v. Johnson, 555 F.2d 115, 118 (3d Cir. 1977); United
States v. Ives, 504 F.2d 935, 939 (9th Cir. 1974), vacated, 421 U.S. 944 (1975).
78. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819-20 n.15 (1975).
79. Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294 (1973); accord, In re Oliver, 333 U.S.
257, 275 (1948).
80. Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 443 (1944).
81. Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 65 (1954).
82. McKenna v. Ellis, 280 F.2d 592 (5th Cir. 1960). "[I]t is basic to due process that an
accused person have a fair opportunity to tell his story in a fair trial." Id. at 595. One
commentator believes that the Court is moving toward a separate constitutional doctrine of
a right to present a defense since it is at the core of the guilt-determining process. Clinton,
The Right to Present a Defense: An Emergent Constitutional Guarantee in Criminal Trials, 9
IND. L. REV. 713 (1976).
83. See Hughes v. State, 513 P.2d 1115 (Alas. 1973); accord, Donelly v. State, 516
P.2d 396 (Alas. 1973); Arizona v. Noble, 109 Ariz. 539, 514 P.2d 460 (1973); People v.
Mosqueda, 5 Cal. App. 3d 540, 85 Cal. Rptr. 346 (1970); People v. Robles, 2 Cal. 3d 205, 85
Cal. Rptr. 166, 466 P.2d 710 (1970); Pigg v. State, 253 Ind. 329, 253 N.E.2d 266 (1969);
Kinder v. Commonwealth, 269 S.W.2d 212 (Ky. 1954); People v. Farrar, 36 Mich. App. 294,
193 N.W.2d 363 (1972); People v. Rolston, 31 Mich. App. 200, 187 N.W.2d 454 (1971);
People v. Hall, 19 Mich. App. 95, 172 N.W.2d 473 (1969).
84. See, e.g., Arizona v. Noble, 109 Ariz. 539,-, 514 P.2d 460, 462 (1973) (citing
Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443 (1965)); People v. Farrar, 36 Mich. App. 294, 304-05
encompasses the right to testify. One clear example of such language is
Farretta v. California,85 in which the Supreme Court said in dictum that
"[i]t is now accepted, for example, that an accused has a right . . . to
testify on his own behalf .... ",86 Other federal courts have deemed the
right to testify comparable in importance to other interests of the accused
that receive constitutional protection.87 The Supreme Court has noted, for
example, that the right is a privilege of "inestimable value" 88 and has
''an importance similar to the right to be present at one's trial and to
present a defense." 8 9 Furthermore, Judge Fullam in United States ex rel.
Wilcox v. Johnson90  succinctly illustrated the need to elevate the
privilege to constitutional status with the following statement:
if state statutes authorizing criminal defendants to testify were
repealed thereby rendering criminal defendants incompetent to
testify, a state court could constitutionally refuse to permit any
criminal defendant from testifying. Such a result clearly would
be out of step with the current state of the law. Indeed, it would
be ironic to find that the right against self-incrimination is
entitled to constitutional protection but the, right to articulate a
defense is not.9
Thus, although the judiciary has not universally concurred, there is
evidence of a strong sentiment in both federal and state courts that the
right to testify should be recognized as an element of the expanding
concept of due process. 92 Regardless of what test is used to determine
whether the right is an aspect of due process, 93 a strong argument can be
n.20, 193 N.W.2d 363, 369 n.20 (1972) (citing Ferguson v Georgia, 365 U.S. 570 (1961)); In re
Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948); MacKenna v. Ellis, 280 F.2d 592 (5th Cir. 1960)).
85. 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
86. Id. at 819-20 n. 15. Other Supreme Court decisions have also implied in dictum that
the right to testify is constitutional, not just statutory. See, e.g., Brooks v. Tennessee, 406
U.S. 605 (1972) ("Whether the defendant is to testify is an important tactical decision as well
as a matter of constitutional right." Id. at 612); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 225
(1971); Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570, 602 (1961) (Clark, Frankfurter, JJ., concurring).
87. See, e.g., Winters v. Cook, 489 F.2d 174 (5th Cir. 1973) (the right to testify is an
inherently personal and fundamental ight); Poe v. United States, 233 F. Supp. 173 (D.D.C.
1964), afftd, 352 F.2d 639 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
88. United States v. Bentvena, 319 F.2d 916, 943 (2d Cir. 1963), cert. denied sub nom.
Ormento v. United States, 375 U.S. 940 (1963).
89. Id. at 943.
90. No. 73-313, slip op. (E.D. Pa. 1976).
91. Id. at 16-17, quoted in United States ex rel. Wilcox v. Johnson, 555 F.2d 115 (3d
Cir. 1977).
92. See notes 78-82 supra. It is further significant that the Court has considered the
right to testify important in certain nontrial situations. See, e.g., Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411
U.S. 778 (1973) (minimum due process requirements for federal probation revocation
hearings include the opportunity to be heard in person); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471
(1972) (minimum due process requirements in parole revocation hearing include opportunity
to be heard in person).
93. Various tests that have been formulated to determine whether a right is an element
of due process raise the questions (1) whether the right "is implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty" (Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937), overruled on other grounds,
Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969)); (2) whether the right is based on the "fundamen-
tal principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political
institutions" (Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312, 316 (1926)); (3) whether the right reflects
a fundamental principle of liberty and justice which inheres in the very idea of free
made that it is constitutionally guaranteed because the defendant's oppor-
tunity to present a defense and to be heard would be seriously impaired if
he were not permitted to present testimony as a witness.
94
2. Waiver of the Right to Testify -Although they have articulated
no guidelines for waiver of the right to testify, many federal courts refuse
to grant the defendant relief when his failure to testify resulted from a
tactical decision by counsel. 5 Some of these courts have stated that the
privilege of the accused to testify is merely statutory and its exercise is
subject to trial counsel's determination. 96 Other federal courts have fol-
lowed the precedent of Supreme Court decisions that allow counsel in
criminal proceedings to waive certain of his client's constitutional rights
even when the waiver is unilateral and without defendant's approval.
97
Regardless of the nature of the right to testify, the courts have reached
these conclusions by the application of the "trial tactics" doctrine, which
posits that authority must be shared by the attorney and client during the
course of the trial. 98 This conclusion is also based on the attorney's
professional responsibility to assume direction and control of the de-
fense. 99 There are, however, limitations to the trial tactics doctrine that
the courts and the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility have recog-
nized. 100
It is generally acknowledged that if the constitutional right affected
government" (Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 106 (1908)); (4) and whether the right is
"so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked fundamental"
(Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)). Since the right to testify has received
recognition relatively recently, it may be difficult to characterize as "so rooted in the
traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked fundamental." Id. Nevertheless,
due process is an ever-expanding concept and "is not confined within a permanent catalo-
gue of what may at a given time be deemed the limits or the essentials of fundamental
rights." Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949).
94. It is generally recognized, for example, that a failure to take the stand adversely
affects the accused's chances for acquittal.
95. United States v. Von Roeder, 435 F.2d 1004 (10th Cir. 1970); Simms v. Lane, 411
F.2d 661 (7th Cir. 1969); United States v. Poe, 352 F.2d 639 (D. C. Cir. 1965); United States
v. Garguilo, 324 F.2d 795 (2d Cir. 1963).
96. See, e.g., United States v. Von Roeder, 435 F.2d 1004 (10th Cir. 1970); Simms v.
Lane, 411 F.2d 661 (7th Cir. 1969). "In the federal courts, the privilege of an accused to
testify in his own defense is merely statutory, abrogating the common law rule of incompe-
tence . . . . [T]he federal rule seems to be that the exercise of this right is subject to the
determination of competent trial counsel and varies with the facts of each case." Id. at 664.
97. See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 534-36 (1972); Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S.
443, 447 (1965).
98. The waiver is viewed merely as a decision of trial strategy and, thus, many
jurisdictions limit review of the attorney's decision to the competence of counsel. See, e.g.,
Simms v. Lane, 411 F.2d 661, 664 (7th Cir. 1969); Hayes v. Russell, 405 F.2d 859, 860 (6th
Cir. 1969); Hudgins v. United States, 340 F.2d 391 (3d Cir. 1965) ("We regard the refusal of
his counsel . . . to permit him to testify at the hearing on the motion as an example of good
trial tactics by an attorney versed in the criminal law." Id. at 396); United States v.
Garguilo, 324 F.2d 795, 797 (2d Cir. 1963); Newsom v. Smyth, 261 F.2d 452, 454 (4th Cir.
1958); Palakiko v. Harper, 209 F.2d 75, 83 (9th Cir. 1953).
99. See notes 15 and 18 and accompanying text supra.
100. See, e.g., ABA STANDARDS, supra note 4, §§ 5.2(a) & (b) and Commentary.
is one of fundamental importance, it can only be waived by the accused'
and the waiver must be evidenced by "an intentional relinquishment or
abandonment of a known right or privilege."10 2 Implicit in several court
opinions is the conclusion that the defendant's right to testify in his own
behalf is one of the inherently personal rights that require a personal
waiver. 103 In Poe v. United States"° the trial judge granted the defendant
a new trial because he had failed to take the stand solely as a consequence
of counsel's erroneous legal advice. In analyzing the nature of the right to
testify, the court noted,
The right to testify is a basic right and there is an obligation on
the part of both the court and trial counsel to inform the ac-
cused of his right to testify if he so desires. Further, it is the
duty of both to assure that the exercise of this basic right by the
accused is a free and meaningful decision.
The right to testify is personal to the accused. He must
make the ultimate decision on whether or not to take the stand.
In this regard, it is unlike other decisions, which are often called
"trial decisions" where it is counsel who decides whether to
cross-examine a particular witness or introduce a particular
document. Here it is the accused who must decide and it is the
duty of counsel to present to him the relevant information on
which he may make an intelligent decision. 05
Other federal" and state courts10 7 have adopted this position, which
represents a developing trend. Thus, if an attorney in a criminal proceed-
ing successfully keeps his client off the stand against his will, counsel's
action will probably be considered prejudicial. 0 8
101. Those rights that are currently regarded as "inherently personal" and that require
a personal waiver as a matter of constitutional law, include (1) guilty pleas, Boykin v.
Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969); (2) the right to counsel and the right to refrain from self-
incrimination, Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); (3) right to appeal, Fay v. Noia, 372
U.S. 391 (1963); (4) right to a jury trial, Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276 (1930).
102. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938). The requirement of a "knowing" and
"intelligent" waiver is generally applied to a defendant's decision to forgo a right constitu-
tionally guaranteed to protect a fair trial and the reliability of the truth-determining process.
Thus, if there is no need to protect the fairness of the trial itself, the standard to determine
the voluntariness of the waiver is relaxed. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218,236-40
(1973).
103. See, e.g., Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (choice of whether the defendant
will testify or not must be the unfettered exercise of his own will); Winters v. Cook, 489
F.2d 174 (5th Cir. 1973) (the right to testify is an inherently personal fundamental right that
can be waived only by the defendant).
104. 233 F. Supp. 173 (D.D.C. 1964), aff'd, 352 F.2d 639 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
105. Id. at 176.
106. See, e.g., Winters v. Cook, 489 F.2d 174 (5th Cir. 1973).
107. Hughes v. State, 513 P.2d 1115 (Alas. 1973) ("No defendant requesting to testify
should be deprived of exercising that right and conveying his version of the facts to the court
or jury, regardless of competent counsel's advice to the contrary." Id. at 1119); Arizona v.
Noble, 109 Ariz. 539, 514 P.2d 460 (1973) ("Fundamental constitutional rights such as the
right to testify should not be deemed waived by an independent determination on the part of
defendant's counsel. ... Id. at 462); People v. Robles, 2 Cal. 3d 205, 85 Cal. Rptr. 166,
466 P.2d 710 (1970) ("[T]he right to testify in one's own behalf is of such fundamental
importance that a defendant who timely demands to take the stand contrary to the advice
given by his counsel has the right to give an exposition of his defense before a jury." Id.
at 215, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 172, 466 P.2d at 716.
108. This may be particularly true when the attorney prevents the defendant from
3. Right to Direct Examination.-Even if the defendant's right to
testify is constitutionally protected and can only be waived by him, a
court will not readily allow a defendant to use his right as a shield to
commit perjury. The Supreme Court in Harris v. New York' °9 adopted
this position on a point involving the Miranda warning. "Every criminal
defendant is privileged to testify in his own defense, or to refuse to do so.
But that privilege cannot be construed to include the right to commit
perjury."' 10 Similar reasoning has been applied to situations in which the
criminally accused has attempted to take unfair advantage of his fifth
amendment privilege against self-incrimination"' and when he, by
committing perjury, has attempted to capitalize on the government's
inability to impeach.'
12
The attorney's dilemma is not, however, resolved by the language of
the Harris opinion. If the attorney adheres to the ABA Standards and
refrains from directly examining his client he may, in effect, be chil-
ling "3 and limiting the defendant's constitutional right to testify. As an
element of due process and the right to make a defense, the right to testify
may be meaningless without counsel's assistance in eliciting the tes-
timony.
In Ferguson v. Georgia 14 the United States Supreme Court found
unconstitutional a state statute that allowed a criminal defendant to give
an unsworn statement to the jury without the aid of counsel. ' The Court
taking the stand for reasons of conscience rather than trial strategy. In Johns v. Smyth, 176
F. Supp. 949 (E.D. Va. 1959), the court held that the petitioner was denied due process when
his court-appointed attorney failed to make a closing argument to the jury because his
conscience prevented him from doing so. The court implied, however, that if the attorney
had done so for purposes of trial strategy the result may have been different. Id. at 954.
109. 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
110. Id. at 225. In Harris the petitioner had been questioned by the police when he was
taken into custody, but had not been warned of his right to appointed counsel. After he
testified at trial, the prior inconsistent statements that he had made to the police were
admitted in evidence for impeachment purposes only. The court, in approving the admissi-
bility of the statements, said, "The shield provided by Miranda cannot be perverted into a
license to use perjury by way of a defense, free from the risk of confrontation with prior
inconsistent utterances." Id. at 226.
111. In United States v. Knox, 396 U.S. 77 (1969), the Court held that the fifth
amendment gives a taxpayer no privilege to file a false tax return when he is faced with the
alternatives of prosecution for failure to file a return or for incriminating statements in a
truthful return.
112. In Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954), the court said,
Of course, the Constitution guarantees a defendant the fullest opportunity to meet
the accusation against him. He must be free to deny all the elements of the case
against him without thereby giving leave to the Government to introduce by way of
rebuttal evidence illegally secured by it, and therefore not available for its case in
chief. Beyond that, however, there is hardly justification for letting the defendant
affirmatively resort to perjurious testimony in reliance on the Government's disa-
bility to challenge his credibility.
Id. at 65.
113. The client is certain to be reluctant to testify once he realizes that he will not be
assisted by counsel when he is on the witness stand.
114. 365 U.S. 570 (1961).
115. At the time of the Ferguson opinion, Georgia was the only state that still expressly
retained the incompetency rule for persons charged with criminal offenses. To mitigate the
held that the statute could not, in compliance with due process, permit the
defendant to deliver an unsworn statement and yet deny him the right to
have counsel elicit his statement by direct examination. "1 6 In the Court's
opinion, the refusal to provide for the guiding hand of counsel at this
critical stage of the prosecution violated the defendant's sixth and four-
teenth amendment rights. In reaching this conclusion, the Court noted
that the unsworn statement had little value compared with sworn tes-
timony upon which the accused could be cross-examined. 117 The Court
also stressed that because of the tensions of the trial situation the accused
needed counsel's assistance to avoid the many pitfalls facing the accused
when he makes his unsworn statement.11 8
Although the Court's reasoning was explicitly directed to the making
of an unsworn statement,11 9 it applies with equal force to a defendant's
sworn testimony. A strong argument can be propounded that Ferguson
stands for the proposition that a criminal defendant has a right to direct
examination. If Georgia could not, without violating due process, "deny
[the defendant] the right to have counsel question him to elicit his
statement," 120 then, assuming he were guaranteed the constitutional right
to testify, a defendant could not be denied counsel's aid in eliciting the
defendant's sworn testimony. Certainly the prejudicial effect resulting
from the denial of counsel's aid at this stage of the trial is identical
whether the defendant is making an unsworn statement or giving sworn
testimony. 12 1 Moreover, if the Court reasoned that the defendant in
Ferguson was denied due process and assistance of counsel in making a
statement devoid of evidentiary value,1 22 then this reasoning would seem
rigors of the incompetency rule, however, a statute was enacted to allow the criminal
defendant to make an unsworn statement at trial. The statute provided,
In all criminal trials, the prisoner shall have the right to make to the court and jury
such statement in the case as he may deem proper in his defense. It shall not be
under oath, and shall have such force only as the jury may think right to give it.
They may believe it in preference to the sworn testimony in the case. The prisoner
shall not be compelled to answer any questions on cross-examination, should he
think proper to decline to answer.
GA. CODE § 38-415 (1868) (current version codified at GA. CODE ANN. § 38-415 (1974)).
116. Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570, 596 (1961).
117. Id. at 586.
118. Id. at 594. One of the pitfalls mentioned by the court was the defendant's inability
to present a coherent and satisfactory explanation.
119. Justice Brennan's opinion for the Court carefully based the holding upon denial of
the right to have counsel question the accused during his delivery of his unsworn statement
to the jury. Id. at 596. As the majority read the record, the constitutionality of Georgia's
testimonial disqualification of the accused was not at issue. The Georgia legislature's
response to the case indicates, however, that the assembly apparently interpreted the
Court's opinion as declaring the state incompetency statute unconstitutional, because in
1962 the statute was amended to eliminate the accused's testimonial incompetency. See
[19621 Georgia Acts 133-134 (codified as amended at GA. CODE ANN. § 38-415 (1974)).
120. 365 U.S. at 596.
121. Although the trial judge is likely to preface the defendant's unsworn statement
with instructions to the jurors informing them how they should receive the statement as
compared with sworn testimony, the practical effect of the defendant's statement on the
jury is likely to be the same.
122. The primary difference between sworn testimony and an unsworn statement is
that the latter is not considered evidence. Thus, the statement may have the effect of
to apply with greater force when the defendant is giving sworn testimony
that is considered evidence. 123
Thus, although consideration of the defendant's right to testify does
not compel a conclusion that counsel should not follow the ABA Stan-
dards, it is evident that strict adherence to the ABA's proposal conflicts at
least to some extent with the defendant's right to testify.
B. Client's Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel
1. Nature of the Right.-Since Powell v. Alabama "24 the Su-
preme Court has held that the sixth amendment contemplates the right to
effective assistance of counsel in all federal criminal cases. The right to
counsel's assistance applies before, 12 s during, and after trial,126 and is
considered so important that no unrepresented person may be imprisoned
for any offense unless he has waived the right.' 27 Furthermore, a waiver
must be made intelligently by the defendant, cannot be presumed from a
silent record, and must be accepted by the trial court before trial proceeds
without counsel. 1
28
The right to effective assistance of counsel is a logical corollary to
the defendant's constitutional due process rights to be heard and to
present a defense.1 29 It is considered "necessary to insure fundamental
human rights of life and liberty." 30 Without it, the defendant's ability to
assert any of his other rights is adversely affected.131 Thus, it is apparent
supplementing or weakening the evidence, but is of no legal value of itself. In addition, it
does not support the offer of corroborative evidence. Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570,
588 (1961).
123. From a legal standpoint, the presentation of evidence is of greater importance to
the defendant than merely the delivery of an unsworn statement devoid of evidentiary
value, since the validity of any pronouncement by the court is based on the presence or
absence of evidence.
124. 287 U.S. 45 (1932). The Court held that mere appointment of counsel at a time or
under circumstances that would amount to a denial of effective and substantial aid is a
violation of a defendant's due process rights. Id. at 71. The right to effective assistance of
counsel was subsequently extended to state criminal proceedings through the fourteenth
amendment. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
125. In United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967), the Court indicated that the right to
effective assistance of counsel applied to the time before trial, and, therefore, the accused
need not stand alone against the prosecution at any stage of the proceedings when counsel's
absence could derogate from the defendant's right to a fair trial. Id. at 225.
126. In Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963), the court extended the right to
counsel to the post-trial period of appeal.
127. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972). The Court reasoned that since counsel
was necessary to a fair trial, even in the prosecution for a petty offense, no person could be
imprisoned for any offense, whether classified as petty, misdemeanor, or felony, unless he
was represented by competent counsel, absent a knowing and intelligent waiver.
128. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464-65 (1938).
129. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932).
130. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462 (1938).
131. United States v. DeCoster, 487 F.2d 1197 (D.C. Cir. 1973). "The effective assist-
ance of counsel is a defendant's most fundamental right 'for it affects his ability to assert
any other right he may have.' " Id. at 1201 (quoting Schaefer, Federalism and State
Criminal Procedure, 70 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1956)).
that the right to a fair trial underlies the right to the effective assistance of
counsel. 
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2. Judicially Recognized Standards of Effective Assistance.-Ev-
er since the Supreme Court recognized that the right to counsel connotes
the right to effective assistance of counsel, there has been.confusion over
the definition of "effective assistance." The Supreme Court has failed to
enunciate clear standards for the lower courts to follow in deciding claims
of ineffective assistance of counsel.' 33 Without the Supreme Court's
guidance, the lower federal courts and the state courts have developed
various standards for appraising the effectiveness of a defense. 134 Conse-
quently, this multiplicity of standards has not yielded any workable
standard to measure counsel's conduct and has caused inconsistent re-
sults. 135
The earlier federal court opinions were phrased in the due process
language of deprivation of a fair trial.136 The reviewing court merely
inquired whether the defendant's trial was offensive to common and
fundamental ideas of fairness and right. 137 By the mid 1960's the "ex-
tremity" doctrine was universally employed. The rule rendered counsel's
conduct ineffective if, overall, the defendant's trial was a farce, sham, or
mockery of justice. 38 Policy considerations concerning the impact of
such claims on the system greatly influenced the evolution of the doc-
trine. 139 The doctrine has since eroded to the extent that a denial of a fair
132. Jones v. Huff, 152 F.2d 14 (D.C. Cir. 1945).
133. In Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932), the Court specifically said that it
would not assume the duty of appraising the quality of assistance rendered by counsel.
Nevertheless, ever since Powell the Supreme Court has indicated that the guarantee to the
assistance of counsel cannot be satisfied by a mere appointment. See White v. Ragen, 324
U.S. 760 (1945); Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942); Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S.
444 (1940).
134. See notes 136-145 and accompanying text infra.
135. In United States v. Plummer, 260 F.2d 729 (D.C. Cir. 1958), counsel's failure to
raise an insanity defense was not grounds for finding ineffective assistance of counsel,
although the defendant had been shown to be schizophrenic by government psychiatrists
and the defendant's trial had been delayed because of the defendant's incompetence to
stand trial. In Schaber v. Maxwell, 348 F.2d 664 (6th Cir. 1965), and Brooks v. State, 381
F.2d 619 (5th Cir. 1967), however, failure to enter and failure to substantiate a defense of
insanity entitled the defendants to relief for ineffective assistance of counsel, since in each
case it was the accused's only defense.
136. In Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942), overruled, Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S.
25 (1972), the Court reasoned that the right to counsel was not so fundamental and essential
to a fair trial that it would be obligatory on the states through the fourteenth amendment.
137. Id. at 473.
138. This standard was formulated in Diggs v. Welch, 148 F.2d 667 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 325 U.S. 889 (1945), in which the court granted the defendant relief because his
"trial shocked the conscience of the court and made the proceedings a farce and a mockery
of justice." Id. at 670.
139. Stone, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel and Post-Conviction Relief in Criminal
Cases: Changing Standards and Practical Consequences, 7 COLUM. HUMAN RIGHTS L. REV.
427, 430 (1976).
Among the feared ramifications expressed by authorities are cluttered court calen-
dars and damaged reputations of appointed lawyers, a flood of appeals partially
caused by intentionally poor presentations designed to obtain post-conviction relief
trial can now be found without an actual sham or mockery of justice. 140
Nevertheless, five federal circuits and approximately half of the states
14 1
still adhere to the rule.
Those courts that have rejected the farce and mockery criteria have
adopted approaches that attempt to define more narrowly a standard of
adequate assistance. By some of these standards the defendant is "enti-
tled to counsel reasonably likely to render and rendering reasonably
effective assistance"' 142 or to counsel who renders "reasonably compe-
tent assistance." 14 3 In implementing these standards certain courts have
adopted the following guidelines promulgated by the ABA:
144
(1) an attorney must confer with his client as early as possible
and as often as necessary,
(2) he must advise his client of the charges against him and of
his rights,
(3) he must ascertain and develop all appropriate defenses,
(4) he must conduct all necessary investigations, and
(5) he must allow time for reflection and preparation. 45
Although these guidelines have received favorable review from commen-
tators as the fairest and most specific to date, they are still criticized for
being inadequate. 6 In addition to the difficulty presented by the multiple
in weak cases, aspersions cast upon the prosecutor and judge whose duties include
maintaining the integrity of the trial, and the creation of trials in which the court
and counsel are precariously teamed in a cooperative effort at preserving an
adequate defense.
Id. at 430. Two other policy considerations mentioned by the author are the "agency
theory" of responsibility under which the attorney's conduct is imputed to the defendant on
the rationale that the attorney is authorized to act on the defendant's behalf and the .'guilty
anyway' syndrome, characterized by a belief that the defendant's guilt was proved beyond a
reasonable doubt and a reduced perception of the need for a new trial." Id. at 430 (footnotes
omitted).
140. See Bruce v. United States, 379 F.2d 113 (D.C. Cir. 1967). "These words are not
to be taken literally but rather as a vivid description of the principle that the accused has a
heavy burden in showing [the] requisite unfairness." Id. at 116. See also McQueen v.
Swenson, 498 F.2d 207 (8th Cir. 1974). The significance of the erosion of the extremity
doctrine varies according to the context in which the claim arises. Stone, supra note 139, at
447-48. Nevertheless, in United States v. Katz, 425 F.2d 928 (2d Cir. 1970), the court upheld
the conviction of a petitioner whose counsel had fallen asleep during the trial. The court
reasoned that the trial judge could have awakened the attorney when the codefendant's
cross-examination of a witness might have affected the petitioner's case. Id. at 93 1. See also
Hudspeth v. McDonald, 120 F.2d 962 (10th Cir. 1941) (court refused petitioner's claim for
habeas corpus although his counsel was intoxicated throughout the trial).
141. See 1976 WASH. U.L.Q., 503, 507 nn.19-20.
142. Hudson v. Alabama, 493, F.2d 171, 173 (5th Cir. 1974). See also Burston v.
Caldwell, 506 F.2d 24 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 990 (1975); United States v. Beasley,
479 F.2d 1124 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 924 (1973); MacKenna v. Ellis, 280 F.2d 592
(5th Cir. 1960).
143. United States v. DeCoster, 487 F.2d 1197, 1202 (D.C. Cir. 1973). For various other
standards adopted by state courts, see 1976 WASH. U.L.Q. 503, 510-11 nn.31-35.
144. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 4, The Defense Function.
145. Gard, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel--Standards and Remedies, 41 Mo. L.
REV. 483, 496 (1976). These guidelines are a compilation of several of the pertinent provi-
sions found in the ABA Standards. The federal circuit court cases that have adopted these
standards are United States v. DeCoster, 487 F.2d 1197 (D.C. Cir. 1973); and Coles v.
Peyton, 389 F.2d 224 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 849 (1968).
146. See Gard, supra note 145, at 497; Comment, Incompetency of Counsel, 25 BAYLOR
L. REV. 299, 300 (1973).
standards used by the courts, there is the further problem of defining the
burden of proof for ineffective assistance of counsel. The courts that
apply the ABA standards in evaluating counsel's conduct require that the
defendant show a substantial violation on any of the five indicia ar-
ticulated in those standards.'47 If such a violation can be established, the
court will find a denial of the effective assistance of counsel unless the
government can establish a lack of prejudice resulting from the viola-
tion. l4 8 In courts that apply other standards, however, the defendant is
required to show that his attorney's errors substantially prejudiced the
outcome of his case, 149 a burden that is often difficult to sustain.
3. Categories of Counsel's Conduct Held to Be Ineffective.-
Most claims of ineffective assistance of counsel may be placed into one of
the following categories: 150 counsel's poor advice that induced a guilty
plea, counsel's insufficient trial preparation, counsel's general incompe-
tence, 151 and counsel's involvement in a conflict of interest. 152 These
claims may be directed against the attorney's conduct at the pretrial,
153
trial, 1 54 and post-tria' 55 stages of the criminal proceeding, although the
147. United States v. DeCoster, 487 F.2d 1197, 1204 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
148. The court in DeCoster, gave two reasons for placing the burden of proof on the
prosecution. First, precisely because of counsel's ineffectiveness it may be difficult to glean
the necessary information from the record to establish this ineffectiveness. Second, the
government has the burden of proving guilt, and the burden of showing prejudice should not
shift to the defendant after the trial because he is claiming that counsel's ineffective
assistance deprived him of a full adversary trial in the first place.
149. See Williams v. Beto, 354 F.2d 698 (5th Cir. 1965); United States v. Re, 336 F.2d
306 (2d Cir. 1964); Taylor v. United States, 332 F.2d 918 (8th Cir. 1964). According to one
commentator, a showing of prejudice continues to be a crucial element in most successful
claims and is universally required in attacks based on trial tactics. Stone, supra note 139.
Another commentator, however, who analyzed the right of effective assistance of counsel
in light of the harmless error rule propounded in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967),
concluded that the right is "substantial" because of its importance to the conduct of a fair
trial and, therefore, its denial requires a reversal regardless of a showing of prejudice. 43
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1384, 1397 (1975).
150. These categories are dealt with extensively in Stone, supra note 139, at 440-47.
151. This category includes mental and physical defects of counsel. Gard, supra note
145, at 493.
152. This type of claim often arises when codefendants are represented by the same
attorney. See, e.g., Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942); Lullar v. United States, 376
F.2d 243 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Campbell v. United States, 352 F.2d 359 (D.C. Cir. 1965). For an
unusual case in which the defendant alleged a conflict of interests on the part of his
appellate counsel because of a libel suit brought against him by defendant's trial counsel
whom appellate counsel had accused of ineffective assistance, see United States v. Hurt,
543 F.2d 162 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
153. This type of claim is the most common and usually alleges a lack of pretrial
preparation and investigation. Stone, supra note 149, at 441; Comment, 25 BAYLOR L. REV.
299, supra note 146, at 305; Gard, supra note 145 at 485. It is also one of the most successful
claims made by defendants, Finer, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 58 CORNELL L. REV.
1077, 1081-84 (1973), and the type of claim that first elicited comment from the Supreme
Court in Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932), and that is the focus of the more specific
standards that have been developed by the courts. See notes 142-46 and accompanying text
supra.
154. See notes 163-66 and accompanying text infra.
155. These claims usually entail an attack on the attorney's failure to exercise the
attacks on the attorney's trial conduct are the least successful.
15 6
Two considerations explain this result. First, the trial record usually
lacks sufficient information that clearly indicates an error by counsel.
Second, the courts are hesitant to criticize what are often spontaneous
tactical decisions by counsel 57 and consequently give great deference to
counsel's judgment. 158 In this respect, the courts, to sustain counsel's
conduct, often invoke the trial tactics doctrine, which demands that a
defendant make a showing of prejudice to bring a successful action. 159 In
addition, if there is any rational basis' 60 or "reasonable basis"16' for the
decision, the court will dismiss the claim. 1
62
4. Ineffective Trial Conduct.-Trial conduct that has been deemed
ineffective' 63 includes the attorney's failure to cross-examine a witness at
trial, 64 to engage in an adequate cross-examination, 165 and to make a
closing argument that is more than merely perfunctory."' Of these three
forms of conduct the last is particularly pertinent to this analysis because
defendant's right to appeal. For a discussion of cases involving the attorney's post-trial
conduct, see Gard, supra note 145, at 492-93.
156. Id. at 488. See also Note, Effective Assistance of Counselfor the Indigent Defend.
ant, 78 HARV. L. REV. 1434 (1965); Note, Effective Assistance of Counsel, 49 VA. L. REV.
1531, 1536 (1963). See also United States v. DeCoster, 487 F.2d 1197, 1202 (D.C. Cir. 1973);
United States ex rel. Weber v. Ragan, 176 F.2d 579 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 809
(1949).
157. Effective assistance of counsel does not connote errorless counsel. MacKenna v.
Ellis, 280 F.2d 592 (5th Cir. 1960), cent. denied, 368 U.S. 877 (1961). Nor can counsel be
judged ineffective by hindsight. Williams v. Beto, 354 F.2d 698 (5th Cir. 1965). See also
Scott v. United States, 334 F.2d 72 (6th Cir.), cet. denied, 379 U.S. 842 (1964).
158. See Gard, supra note 145, at 489. For examples of counsel's conduct that were
held not to be ineffective despite their seemingly prejudicial nature see, Comment, 25
BAYLOR L. REV. 299, supra note 145, at 307.
159. Turner v. Maryland, 303 F.2d 507 (4th Cir. 1962), aff'd, 318 F.2d 852 (4th Cir.
1963). There are recognized exceptions to the requirement of showing prejudice. See notes
166-67 and accompanying text infra.
160. Gard, supra note 145, at 489.
161. Commonwealth ex rel. Washington v. Maroney, 427 Pa. 599, 604, 235 A.2d 349,
352 (1967).
162. Because of several well-established policies (see note 139 supra), courts are
hesitant to second-guess attorneys and will usually look for any reasonable justification for
their conduct.
163. This list is not meant to be exhaustive, but merely presents trial conduct that is
pertinent to the analysis of the attorney's dilemma. Other trial conduct held to be ineffective
includes counsel's failure to challenge a jury's composition when Blacks have been sys-
tematically excluded from a black defendant's jury, United States ex rel. Goldsby v.
Harpole, 263 F.2d 71 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 850 (1959), and failure to object to
clearly inadmissible and prejudicial testimony. Brubaker v. Dickson, 310 F.2d 30 (9th Cir.
1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 978 (1963); People v. Ibarra, 60 Cal. 2d 460, 386 P.2d 487, 34
Cal. Rptr. 863 (1963).
164. Although not ineffective in itself, the failure to cross-examine in conjunction with
other factors can be deemed ineffective. United States v. Hammonds, 425 F.2d 597 (D.C.
Cir. 1970).
165. People v. Nitti, 312 Ill. 73, 143 N.E. 448 (1924). See also People v. Gardiner, 303
Ill. 204, 135 N.E. 422 (1922).
166. Matthews v. United States, 449 F.2d 985 (D.C. Cir. 1971); United States ex rel.
Wilcox v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 273 F. Supp. 923 (E.D. Pa. 1967); Johns v.
Smyth, 176 F. Supp. 949 (E.D. Va. 1959).
it carries with it a presumption of prejudice. 167 Since there is generally no
valid reason for failing to use the closing argument to reiterate to the jury
the thrust of the defense's case, the court will presume that counsel's
omission was prejudicial. 1" Counsel's complete neglect of the closing
argument or his delivery of a casual summation to the jury may suggest to
the jury that the attorney does not believe his client. 169 It subverts the
accused's only defense 170 and deprives him of his right to have his case
argued vigorously to the jury. 171
5. Problems Posed by the ABA Defense Function Standards.
(a) Prejudicial error resulting from observance of the Standards.-By
strictly observing the ABA Defense Function Guidelines an attorney will
have a substantial adverse effect on his client's constitutional right to
effective assistance of counsel. When he allows his client to make an
unassisted narrative statement on the stand and then refrains from re-
ferring to or relying on that statement in the closing argument, his
conduct raises three distinct problems. 17 2 First, if the prosecution subjects
the defendant to a scathing cross-examination after the defendant's unas-
sisted narrative, counsel must determine whether and to what extent to
examine his client on redirect. 7 3 The ABA Defense Function Standards
offer little guidance at this stage, although they imply that counsel should
not engage in redirect. 74 If the attorney does nothing he may be aiding
167. This presumption seems justified because of the difficulty that the defendant
would have in trying to establish prejudice to his case from the attorney's omission. See
note 148 supra.
168. Gard, supra note 145, at 491.
169. Matthews v. United States, 449 F.2d 985 (D.C. Cir. 1971). Judge Leventhal, in his
concurring opinion, stated even more strongly, "it was more damaging than a casual
summation; it was . . . positively prejudicial to [the] defendant." Id. at 994.
170. Id. See also United States v. DeLoach, 504 F.2d 185 (D.C. Cir. 1974). In this case
the trial court had restricted defense counsel's (but not the prosecution's) closing argument.
The court held that it was error for the trial court to prevent defense counsel from making a
point essential to the defense.
171. Matthews v. United States, 449 F.2d 985 (D.C. Cir. 1971). This right is an aspect
of the defendant's right to a jury trial.
172. Professor Freedman raises another practical problem that is not addressed in the
text:
The prosecutor might well object to testimony from the defendant in narrative
form rather than in the conventional manner, because it would give the prosecutor
no opportunity to object to inadmissible evidence prior to the jury's hearing it. The
[ABA] Standards provide no guidance as to what the defense attorney should do if
the objection is sustained.
M. FREEDMAN, supra note 37, at 37.
173. One way of avoiding this problem may be to strike a bargain with the prosecution
according to which the prosecutor would agree to refrain from cross-examination in ex-
change for defense counsel's observance of the ABA Standards rather than eliciting the
perjurious testimony. This solution, however, may be difficult to implement.
174. The comment to § 7.7 of the ABA Standards indicates that the attorney's obliga-
tion to refrain from introducing or aiding the presentation of false testimony is absolute.
When this language is considered in conjunction with the prohibition against engaging in
direct examination, the inference seems justified. The ABA Standards also fail to comment
on whether the attorney should object to an improper line of questioning by the prosecutor
during cross-examination.
the prosecution and severely damaging his client's case. '75 Second, when
the attorney fails to refer to his client's testimony in his closing argument,
his silence may suggest to the jury that he does not deem his client's
testimony credible and that he considers his client guilty. 176 This may be
especially true if there is very little additional evidence that counsel can
use to argue his client's innocence. Last, a prosecutor may develop these
inferences in his closing argument and thereby cast considerable doubt on
the defendant's innocence. 177 Thus, there is substantial likelihood that an
attorney's compliance with the ABA Defense Function Standards will
prejudice his client's cause and prevent him from receiving a fair trial.
(b) Client's chances for relief.-The effects of complying with the
ABA Defense Function Guidelines and making a perfunctory closing
argument are similar. 178 If the client attacks the conduct of counsel who
complied with the ABA Guidelines, however, he is in effect seeking
relief for his attorney's refusal to aid in perjury. Certainly no court will
entertain such a bold claim unless other considerations are present. 179
Thus, the ultimate success of such a claim would depend on the
court's determination that counsel lacked a proper foundation for his
belief that the defendant was about to perjure himself. I I Since this raises
175. The prosecutor may have impeached the defendant's credibility on matters unre-
lated to the false testimony. Under these circumstances, the attorney may be disregarding
an opportunity to rehabilitate his client on such matters.
176. This problem is one often cited by the commentators who are critical of the
approach formulated in the ABA Standards. See M. FREEDMAN, supra note 37, at 37;
Bowman, Standards of Conduct for Prosecution and Defense Personnel: An Attorney's
Viewpoint, 5 Am. CRIM. L.Q. 28, 30 (1966).
177. The validity of this tactic is questionable in light of Griffin v. California, 380 U.S.
609 (1965). In Griffin the Court held that the prosecutor cannot comment to the jury on the
defendant's failure to take the stand, since that would chill the defendant's constitutional
right to remain silent. Nevertheless, applying this rationale to the attorney's failure to
examine the defendant would require a finding that this conduct chilled the defendant's
constitutional right to testify.
178. Counsel's conduct would prejudice his client's defense, and the presumption of
prejudice would apply. See notes 166-171 and accompanying text supra.
179. There are very few reported cases of defendants claiming ineffective assistance of
counsel because of counsel's adherence to the ABA Standards. State v. Robinson, 290 N.C.
56, 224 S.E.2d 174 (1976), is of interest, however, because it recognized the practical effect
of the conduct of counsel who follows the ABA Standards, although in this case it was the
defendant's witness, not the defendant, who intended to perjure himself. The court recog-
nized that when counsel started to examine the witness but then sat down and allowed the
defendant to continue the examination, the jury could infer that the attorney thought little of
the witness's credibility and was at odds with the defendant. The issue of effective assist-
ance of counsel was never reached, however. Instead, the court held that the trial court's
refusal to relieve defense counsel of his assignment, although it relieved him of the responsi-
bility of eliciting the alleged perjurious testimony, denied the defendant the fair trial
required by due process. The court reasoned that it was not the trial court's refusal of the
defendant's requests for other counsel, but its attempt to afford the defendant the assist-
ance of counsel that constituted error.
180. In McKissick v. United States, 379 F.2d 754 (5th Cir. 1967), the defendant
appealed a criminal conviction claiming that he was twice put in jeopardy in violation of the
fifth amendment. At the defendant's first trial, counsel informed the court in chambers that
the defendant had admitted that he had perjured himself on the stand. Counsel then sought
a question of proof and because of the effect of the attorney's conduct, the
burden would probably fall on the attorney to substantiate his belief.18'
The defendant may also be required to lay some foundation for his claim
by requesting new counsel at trial' 82 and alleging that counsel's belief is
unfounded.
Defendant's chances for success may further depend on the standard
employed by the court to measure attorney conduct.' 83 For example,
many claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are characterized by
consistently poor performance by the attorney throughout the trial.' 84
When the defendant attacks the attorney's conduct under the ABA Stan-
dards, however, his claim may allege only one or two errors by counsel
who, overall, might have performed adequately. Thus, the court would
be compelled to examine counsel's specific acts rather than apply the
traditional standards, since even the more specific standards do not
address a particular course of conduct. 8  Under such scrutiny, it is
possible that a defendant could attack the conduct of counsel who follows
the ABA Standard.
V. Practical Inadequacies of the ABA Defense Function Proposal
Compliance with the ABA Defense Function Standards when the
attorney believes his client will perjure himself raises not only constitu-
tional problems, but also poses practical difficulties. First, if trial is about
to commence, has already commenced, or court appointed counsel is
seeking to withdraw, it is unlikely that the court will grant any request for
withdrawal. 1
86
Second, the ABA Defense Function Standards do not articulate the
extent of the attorney's disclosure necessary to justify his request. The
to withdraw from the case and also moved for a mistrial. The court allowed the attorney to
withdraw and granted the motion for a mistrial since the defendant would have lacked
representation. After being convicted at his second trial, the defendant appealed.
The court held that if the defendant did not make the statement to his attorney, the
judgment must be reversed, since the attorney would have been acting in a manner so
adverse to the defendant's interests that he was deprived of the effective assistance of
counsel.
181. As a practical matter it would be very difficult for the defendant to prove a
negative. In addition, the attorney is expected to take measures to preserve that type of
evidence on the record. See ABA STANDARDS, supra note 4. Comment to § 7.7, at 275. See
also note 175 supra.
182. See State v. Robinson, 290 N.C. 56, 224 S.E.2d 174 (1976). By bringing the
conflict between the attorney and client to the court's attention, the defendant may improve
the likelihood of success on review since the breakdown in the attorney-client relationship
will be preserved on the record.
183. See notes 134-145 and accompanying text supra.
184. See, e.g., United States v. Burks, 470 F.2d 432 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Brooks v. Texas,
381 F.2d 619 (5th Cir. 1967).
185. Such an approach was taken by the court in McQueen v. Swenson, 498 F.2d 207,
214 (8th Cir. 1974), despite the court's nominal adherence to the extremity doctrine.
Nevertheless, in McQueen the defendant had the burden of showing prejudice.
186. See ABA STANDARDS, supra note 4, at 275-76; M. FREEDMAN, supra note 37, at
34.
attorney, when he attempts to convince the court of the need for with-
drawal, must remain aware that his request may be denied and, therefore,
must refrain from divulging sensitive client-counselor information.187 If
the court accepts an explanation based on ethical considerations no
problem arises, but if the court is dissatisfied with the explanation, it will
require further information that may result in prejudicial inferences. The
problem of judicial bias could easily arise in this context, and this effect
may have practical consequences when sentence is pronounced. 88 Fur-
thermore, the defendant could reasonably argue that his attorney violated
the attorney-client privilege and no longer zealously represents his inter-
ests. 189 Consequently, he may justifiably request the appointment of new
counsel, which will serve to complicate trial even further.1
90
Third, it is difficult to ascertain how the attorney "knows" that his
client will commit perjury. 9 ' If counsel merely informs the judge of his
belief that his client intends to commit perjury, but does not possess a
factual basis for this belief, he would be violating the obligation of
confidentiality. 92 Yet, it may be very difficult for the attorney to deter-
mine what facts justify his disclosure to the court. It has been suggested
by courts that a mere unsubstantiated opinion is insufficient, 9 3 but that
187. The ABA Standards reject any solution that would involve informing the trial
judges of the reason for withdrawal. See ABA STANDARDS, supra note 4, Comment to § 7.7,
at 275.
188. This problem is recognized by Professor Freedman, M. FREEDMAN, supra note 37,
at 34, and by the ABA Standards, ABA STANDARDS, supra note 4, Comment to § 7.7, at 277.
Perhaps the prejudicial effect of the attorney's disclosure should result in the court's
disqualification at least at the sentencing stage.
189. This would be particularly true if the foundation for the attorney's belief that his
client was about to commit perjury was not substantial. Nevertheless, there is support in the
ABA Code for the proposition that this sort of information is outsidf the obligation of
confidentiality. See Edwards, Hard Answers for Hard Questions: Dissenting in Part from
Dean Freedman's Views on the Attorney-Client Privilege, II CRIM. L. BULL. 478, 480-82
(1975); Meagher, A Critique of Lawyers'Ethics in an Adversary System, 4 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 289,291 (1976). See also State v. Henderson, 205 Kan. 231, 368 P.2d 136 (1970) (perjury
is not included among the confidences an attorney is obliged to keep).
190. Although a criminal defendant is not entitled to different counsel whenever there
is a difference of opinion between appointed counsel and his client on trial strategy, when
the disagreement jeopardizes one of the defendant's constitutional rights it may signal a
breakdown in the attorney-client relationship and require new counsel. See People v.
Williams, 2 Cal. 3d 964, 88 Cal. Rptr. 208, 471 P.2d 1008 (1970); People v. Robles, 2 Cal. 3d
205, 85 Cal. Rptr. 166, 466 P.2d 710 (1970). In State v. Robinson, 290 N.C. 56, 224 N.E.2d
174 (1976), the defendant requested new counsel claiming that the attorney representing him
was "not going to put in any evidence in the case" since he believed that the defendant
would perjure himself. The trial court denied his request, and the state supreme court
reversed his conviction, not because new counsel was denied, but because the trial court
ordered his present counsel to continue to represent him. Id. at 176.
191. There is always the epistomological problem of how the attorney "really knows"
that his client is guilty or that he intends to commit perjury. On a theoretical level, he can
only know that his client is "legally guilty" after he has been pronounced guilty by the
court. Even on a practical level he cannot be sure that his client's admission of guilt is true.
See generally M. FREEDMAN, supra note 37, at 51-57; Weiss, Book Review, 44 GEO. WASH.
L. REv. 202 (1975).
192. See ABA CODE, supra note 3, CANON 4; United States ex rel. Wilcox v. Johnson,
555 F.2d 115; 122 (3d Cir. 1977).
193. United States ex rel. Wilcox v. Johnson, 555 F.2d 115, 122 (3d Cir. 1977).
client's statement that he intends to commit perjury may suffice as a
foundation. 94 These conclusory statements offer no more guidance than
a casual reading of the-Code would suggest. Moreover, the attorney's
"knowledge" may be little more than an intuition that he cannot articu-
late. As a practical consequence, the attorney might reveal to the court his
client's announced intention to commit perjury when his client is in fact
innocent. 95 In contrast, the attorney may in another case believe beyond
a reasonable doubt, because of his personal acquaintance with the defend-
ant and all the evidence available to him, that his client is guilty and will
commit perjury. Because there has been no actual admission, however,
he may not disclose his opinion to the court.
Finally, if withdrawal is allowed, its only effect is to impose the
burden of making a difficult decision upon yet another attorney. This
result raises the question whether an attorney can ethically withdraw
when he belives that the accused will deceive a subsequent attorney and
still commit perjury.196 Furthermore, the criminally accused will realize
that the obligation of confidentiality is not absolute and will probably
withhold any incriminating evidence from his next attorney, thereby
diminishing that attorney's opportunity to present an effective defense. 
197
VI. Conclusion
The criminal defense attorney can disregard neither the dual nature
of his role as a member of the legal profession nor his client's constitu-
tional rights. The criminally accused is entitled to a fair opportunity to be
heard and to present a defense, which encompass the right to testify at
trial. Those rights are fundamental and can only be waived by the
defendant. Furthermore, the right to testify is meaningless without the aid
of direct examination by counsel. The Constitution also guarantees the
defendant the effective assistance of counsel to insure that he receives a
fair trial. Consequently, the attorney must control and direct the defense
to enhance in whatever manner possible his client's chances for acquittal.
There is no easy solution, if indeed there is any solution, to the
attorney's dilemma when he believes his client will commit perjury. The
ABA Code clearly commands that a lawyer must not "knowingly use
perjured testimony or false evidence," 1 98 but does not explain how this
obligation can practically be discharged. Moreover, the ABA Standards,
which represent an attempt to resolve the attorney's quandary, are simi-
larly unsatisfactory in practice because they fail to address the constitu-
tional complications that are likely to arise.
194. State v. Henderson, 205 Kan. 231, 468 P.2d 136 (1970).
195. This situation could arise if the client is attempting to assume responsibility for a
guilty family member. Professor Freedman recognizes this problem and notes other situa-
tions in which similar problems can arise. M. FREEDMAN, supra note 37, at 30, 55.
196. Id. at 33.
197. Id.
198. ABA CODE, supra note 3, DR7-102(A) (4).
Withdrawal becomes a progressively unsatisfactory solution as the
trial date approaches. Implicit in withdrawal is the potential for judicial
bias. The use of the narrative statement without the assistance of
counsel's examination is also problematical because the ABA Standards
fail to explain, for example, how the attorney should contend with a
scathing cross-examination by the prosecutor. Moreover, it is unrealistic
to insist that the dilemma presented by the perjurious client only arises
when the client specifically informs his attorney that he intends to commit
perjury. Finally, the Standards fail to address the likely prejudicial effect
of the attorney's failure to argue his client's testimony to the jury.
In contrast to the ABA solution, Professor Freedman attempts to
deal pragmatically with the perjury dilemma in the context of an adver-
sary system of justice that guarantees the defendant numerous constitu-
tional safeguards. Although Professor Freedman's proposal has been
vigorously attacked for rendering the criminal defense lawyer the mouth-
piece of his client, it at least offers an attorney a decisive course of
conduct that avoids inadequate compromises. For this reason, Professor
Freedman's position cannot be summarily dismissed.
Ultimately, the bench and the bar must decide whether and how an
attorney should be discliplined for his refusal to conform to the ABA
Standards. The difficulty of evaluating whether the attorney knew of his
client's perjury will undoubtedly present problems for any court or
disciplinary board that assesses the defense counsel's conduct in retros-
pect. Perhaps the ABA should adopt the position of the Canadian Bar
Association, which resolves the dilemma by forbidding the presentation
of perjured testimony, but requires that the client be given advance notice
of the attorney's duty. Although the client under the Canadian scheme
might be quite reluctant to fully inform his attorney of all facets of his
case, this alternative would avoid placinq the attorney in a position of
jeopardizing his client's constitutional rights. If the ABA does not adopt
this position, it should at least change its current position to offer the
criminal defense attorney guidelines that are more compatible with the
nature of the criminal justice system.
J. ScoTT ROBINSON

